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Assessing the “Canning Agenda”: British foreign policy 
towards Latin America in the twenty-first century  
 
In November 2010, the British Foreign Secretary William Hague delivered Canning House’s 
annual lecture on the topic of Britain’s relations with Latin America.1 In his speech, Hague 
pledged to ‘halt the decline in Britain’s diplomatic presence in Latin America’. ‘It is now 
time’, Hague went on, ‘for an advance to begin’.2 In thus launching the so-called “Canning 
Agenda”, Hague acknowledged both the steep decline in Britain’s status in Latin America 
over the course of the twentieth century and a new determination to reverse this process at 
the opening of the twenty-first.  
Britain certainly has experienced a significant loss of power and influence in Latin 
America in modern times. From a position of hegemony in the nineteenth century, Britain’s 
economic interests and its political influence in Latin America dwindled from the First 
World War onwards. This decline occurred for a number of reasons. British investment in 
Latin America was concentrated in public utilities, railways and sovereign debt – all areas 
that became unprofitable in the twentieth century. Britain’s export trade suffered too as 
demand in Latin America for traditional goods like coal and textiles gave way to a desire for 
new consumer products – such as household electrical goods and automobiles. In these 
sectors, Britain was unable to compete with imports from Germany and the United States.  
British officials deferred to the US more willingly when it came to political influence 
in the region, recognising Latin America as part of the US sphere of influence in the Cold 
War. More generally, Latin America was often considered of secondary importance to 
Britain’s global interests in the post-World War II era. When British officials did focus on 
Latin America, they often struggled to formulate effective responses to the emerging forces 
of political nationalism that shaped the region in the twentieth century.3  
Britain’s failure to accurately perceive the political forces at play in Latin America 
was confirmed when the UK was caught off-guard by Argentina’s invasion of the Falkland 
Islands in 1982.4 Ironically, one consequence of that conflict – as well as the debt crisis of the 
same time – was a renewed interest in Latin America among British officials. There followed 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s a series of statements from government ministers promising 
to redress Britain’s disregard for Latin America of previous decades. As Foreign Secretary 
Geoffrey Howe put it in an earlier address to Canning House: ‘Now we can say, without any 
fear of contradiction, that the period of neglect is over’.5 This statement turned out to be 
                                                 
1 Canning House describes itself as ‘the UK’s leading forum for informed comment, contacts and debate on Latin 
American politics, economy and business’. See https://www.canninghouse.org/.  
2 William Hague, ‘Britain and Latin America: historic friends, future partners’, 9 Nov. 2010, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/britain-and-latin-america-historic-friends-future-partners. 
3 Leslie Bethell, ‘Britain and Latin America in historical perspective’, in Victor Bulmer-Thomas ed., Britain and 
Latin America: a changing relationship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 1-24; Alan Knight, 
‘Latin America’, in Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis eds, The Oxford history of the British empire, Volume IV, 
the twentieth century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 632-42; Rory Miller, Britain and Latin America in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (London: Longman, 1993).   
4 Hugh Thomas, ‘Preface’, in The Thatcher years: Britain and Latin America (London: Latin American Bureau, 1988), 
p. 6. 
5 Quoted in Victor Bulmer-Thomas, ‘British relations with Latin America into the 1990s’, in Bulmer-Thomas ed., 
Britain and Latin America, p. 227. For references to further ministerial statements, see Louise Fawcett and Eduardo 
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somewhat premature. Latin America’s diminutive status was confirmed in the opening 
decade of the twenty-first century with the closure of a number of diplomatic missions in the 
region.6 
However, recent years have seen many of the trends that precipitated Britain’s 
retreat from Latin America showing signs of change. In the wake of the financial crisis of 
2007-8, a broad consensus emerged across the British political spectrum over the need to 
rebalance the country’s economy by boosting overseas trade and investment. The focus of 
this effort has largely been on the so-called emerging economies, most prominently China 
and India, but also Latin American countries like Brazil and Mexico.7 The decision taken by 
referendum in June 2016 for Britain to leave the European Union has intensified this effort 
under the broad policy banner of ‘Global Britain’.8 At the same time, the end of the Cold 
War and a general shift in the global balance of power in favour of the global South has seen 
Latin America emerge from beneath the shadow of the United States as a part of the world 
of increasing economic and political importance.9   
 Notwithstanding these developments, scholarly analysis of Britain’s relations with 
Latin America remains sparse. While there is a small body of historical literature on British-
Latin American relations in the twentieth century, students of contemporary international 
politics have largely ignored relations in the twenty-first century. The nearest things 
approaching scholarly analysis of the Canning Agenda were two commentaries on Hague’s 
Canning Lecture by think tanks focused on British foreign policy. The first of these appeared 
in Chatham House’s magazine, The World Today, in March 2011. The authors, Laurence Allen 
and Guy Edwards, take a dim view of the Canning Agenda, arguing that it fails to embrace 
the newly empowered Latin American countries as significant partners and ignores 
multilateral forms of diplomacy in favour of an outdated form of mercantilism.10 Peter 
Cannon of the Henry Jackson Society is only slightly less scathing. Similarly criticising the 
over-emphasis on commercial relations, Cannon argues that more importance should be 
granted to shared values of democracy and human rights, translating into strategic 
cooperation between Britain and the countries of Latin America.11 While these commentaries 
                                                 
Posada-Carbó, ‘Britain and Latin America: “hope in a time of change?”’ (London: Institute of Latin American 
Studies, 1996), p. 2.  
6 Michael D. Kandiah and Thomas C. Mills eds, British diplomacy in Latin America at the turn of the 21st century: 
witness seminar (London: Institute of Contemporary British History, 2015), p. 15. 
7 Michael Harvey, ‘Perspectives on the UK’s place in the world’, Chatham House Europe programme paper 
2011/01, Dec. 2011. 
8 See, for example, the landmark speeches by the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary: Theresa May, ‘The 
government's negotiating objectives for exiting the EU: PM speech’, 17 Jan. 2017, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-
speech; Boris Johnson, ‘Beyond Brexit: a Global Britain’, 2 Dec. 2016, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/beyond-brexit-a-global-britain. 
9 Fareed Zakaria, The post-American world (New York: W.W. Norton, 2009); Oscar Guardiola-Rivera, What if Latin 
America ruled the world? How the south will take the north in the twenty-first century (London: Bloomsbury, 2010). 
10 Laurence Allen and Guy Edwards, ‘UK-Latin America: rearranging the deckchairs’, The World Today 67: 3, 2011, 
pp. 29-31.  
11 Peter John Cannon, ‘Britain’s new outreach to Latin America’, 5 July 2011, 
http://henryjacksonsociety.org/2011/07/05/britains-new-outreach-to-latin-america/. In addition to these 
publications, Canning House commissioned Latin News to prepare a review of the Canning Agenda for 
circulation among its members in 2015. Focusing primarily trade and investment, the report concluded that while 
notable efforts had been made by the coalition government of 2010-15, ‘the full potential for achieving closer 
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in the immediate aftermath of Hague’s speech hint at some of the shortcomings of Britain’s 
policy towards Latin America, a more sustained analysis of the Canning Agenda seems 
warranted some eight years after its announcement.  
In providing this assessment, this article argues that a renewed focus on Latin 
America in British foreign policy is certainly in evidence. Following Hague’s speech in 2010, 
there has been a discernible policy, labelled the Canning Agenda by British government 
officials and observed by their counterparts in the region, aimed at rejuvenating Britain’s 
relations with Latin America.12 The most obvious outward signs of this policy include the re-
opening of British embassies in the region, as well as a significant increase in the number of 
ministerial visits to Latin America.13 At the softer end of international relations, there has 
been an increase in cultural exchanges between Britain and Latin America in recent years. 14 
The British Royal Family has also been deployed to promote UK-Latin American ties with a 
visit to Brazil by Prince Harry in 2014 and state visits at Buckingham Palace granted to 
President Peña Nieto of Mexico in 2015 and President Santos of Colombia in 2016. 
However, while the Canning Agenda may represent a renewed effort by Britain to 
improve relations with Latin America, it does not constitute a strategic reorientation of 
British policy towards the region. Indeed, the Canning Agenda still faces many of the same 
hurdles in its goal of rejuvenating Britain’s economic and political standing in Latin America 
that impeded this ambition in the past. British commerce in the region is dwarfed by that of 
established powers like the USA – as well as new powers like China – and continues to lag 
behind other European countries. The focus on Latin America by the British government 
struggles to compete with the bigger economies in Asia, as well as the political energies 
consumed by Brexit against a backdrop of reduced government spending. Political relations 
with Latin American countries are complicated by the challenge to established norms of 
global governance posed by emerging powers like Brazil. In addition, old issues of 
contention – like the continued dispute with Argentina over the status of the Falkland 
Islands – remain. 
As noted, the challenges faced by the contemporary Canning Agenda echo the issues 
confronted by Britain in Latin America throughout the twentieth century. In distilled form, 
these consist of: the decline in Britain’s economic competiveness; the challenges posed by the 
role of other external powers in the region; the significance granted to Latin America in 
Britain’s global strategic priorities; and the difficulties encountered in responding to the 
political character and ambitions of Latin American governments. These categories will thus 
                                                 
relations and increased trade between the UK and Latin America is not yet being realized’. ‘The Canning 
Agenda: a long way to go’, Canning Papers, Sept. 2015. 
12 For example, in November 2016, Sir Alan Duncan (Foreign Office minister of state for Europe and the 
Americas) gave a speech to mark ’six years since the Government launched its Canning Agenda, which is our 
strategy to revitalise our historic relations with Latin America’. Sir Alan Duncan, ‘The UK and Latin America – 
Latin America investment forum speech’, 10 Nov. 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-uk-and-
latin-america-latin-american-investment-forum-speech. Julian Ventura, the Mexican ambassador to the UK, 
describes ‘a very sustained political and economic engagement’ by Britain in Latin America over recent years. 
Author interview with Julian Ventura, 23 Jan. 2018.   
13 ‘Strengthening Britain’s diplomatic network in Latin America and the Caribbean’, 21 June 2012, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/strengthening-britains-diplomatic-network-in-latin-america-and-the-
caribbean; Lord Howell, ‘Making the most of our relations with Latin America’, 22 March 2012, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/making-the-most-of-our-relations-with-latin-america. 
14 See, for example, ‘Mexican culture to be celebrated in UK schools’, 3 March 2015, 
https://www.britishcouncil.org/organisation/press/mexican-culture-be-celebrated-uk-schools.  
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be used to assess the success – existing and potential – of the Canning Agenda in its aim of 
reversing Britain’s historic decline in Latin America in the opening decades of the twenty-




Promoting greater British commerce with Latin America has been the central theme of the 
Canning Agenda since William Hague announced the policy in 2010. As the Foreign 
Secretary put it in his speech to Canning House: ‘We will look for new economic 
opportunities, encouraging investment in the UK, working to raise the profile of the region 
with British business, and helping British business access markets in the region’.16  
 In seeking to achieve these aims, the government has predominantly looked to the 
kind of ministerial trade missions employed by British governments to try to arrest the 
country’s decline in Latin America throughout the twentieth century.17 Deputy Prime 
Minister Nick Clegg headed a trade mission to Mexico in 2011 and a further visit taking in 
Colombia, as well as Mexico, in 2014.18 Looking beyond the more obvious of Britain’s 
economic partnerships in Latin America, reciprocal trade missions have occurred between 
Britain and Cuba, in response to the economic liberalisation under way on the island.19 The 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Philip Hammond also led a trade mission to Argentina in 
August 2017 where opportunities to strengthen Britain’s economic links with the country 
were explored following the election of the pro-market President Macri.20 Most recently, 
Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson made a tour of Argentina, Chile and Peru in May 2018 in an 
effort to improve post-Brexit trade with these countries.21  
 More formal mechanisms for building economic links have been established between 
Britain and Brazil. In 2015, the two countries established the UK-Brazil Economic and 
Financial Dialogue (EFD). Covering topics from trade infrastructure to financial services, 
this forum has facilitated sustained economic cooperation between Britain and Brazil, with 
the second EFD taking place in July 2017.22 More generally, the strengthening of Britain’s 
                                                 
16 Hague, ‘Britain and Latin America’. 
17 Knight, ‘Latin America’, pp. 632-3. 
18 ‘Nick Clegg to lead UK charm offensive in Latin America’, The Guardian, 28 March 2011, 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/mar/28/nick-clegg-latin-america-business; ‘Nick Clegg brings 
business delegation to Latin America’, 3 Feb. 2014, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/nick-clegg-brings-
business-delegation-to-latin-america.  
19 ‘Philip Hammond becomes first foreign secretary to visit Cuba since 1959 revolution’, Daily Telegraph, 28 April 
2016, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/28/philip-hammond-becomes-first-foreign-secretary-to-visit-
cuba-sin/. For more on Cuba’s liberalisation, see Julia E. Sweig and Michael J. Bustamante, ‘Cuba after 
communism: the economic reforms that are transforming the island’, Foreign Affairs 92: 4, July/Aug. 2013, pp. 101-
114.  
20 ‘The Chancellor of the Exchequer will visit Argentina’, 1 Aug. 2017, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/the-chancellor-of-the-exchequer-will-visit-argentina.  
21 ‘Boris Johnson to make first visit by British foreign secretary to Argentina for 25 years, The Independent, 19 May 
2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/boris-johnson-argentina-visit-first-foreign-secretary-25-
years-falklands-brexit-a8359376.html. 
22 ‘Joint statement by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Finance Minister of Brazil after the inaugural UK-
Brazil Economic and Financial Dialogue held in London on October 29, 2015’, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/.../20151029_UK_Brazil_EFD_joint_statment.pdf; ‘Chancellor in Brazil and 
Argentina to boost economic and trade ties’, 31 July 2017, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/chancellor-in-
brazil-and-argentina-to-boost-economic-and-trade-ties.  
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diplomatic presence in Latin America has facilitated greater government support for British 
businesses in Latin America.  
It is clear from the above, then, that there have been significant efforts to strengthen 
Britain’s economic ties with Latin America since the launch of the Canning Agenda in 2010. 
Undoubtedly, this has led to individual successes for British businesses. For example, 
Express Engineering benefited from a new consulate in Recife to make substantial inroads 
into Brazil’s oil and gas extraction industry.23 More broadly, Britain has improved its 
economic standing in specific countries. British direct investment in Brazil more than 
doubled in the period between 2010 and 2014 to a figure of £15 billion.24 In Colombia, albeit 
from a low starting point, the value of British exports has increased markedly, and total 
trade between the two countries is now worth more than £1 billion.25  
Relative to its competitors in the region, however, Britain’s economic standing in 
Latin America has not substantially improved. Britain’s total share of the import market for 
goods in Latin America and the Caribbean has continued to hover around 1 per cent 
throughout the period since 2010, standing at 0.9 per cent in 2016. This figure is dwarfed by 
the major external economic powers in the region like the United States and China (which 
accounted for 32.7 and 18.4 per cent of the region’s imports respectively in 2016). It is also 
some way behind more comparable European economies like Germany (which provided 4 
per cent of the region’s imports in 2016) and France (1.6 per cent). Britain’s share of the 
goods export market for the region is slightly higher, standing at 1.1 per cent of the total in 
2010, rising to 1.2 per cent in 2016. However, this compares with a 46 per cent share held by 
the United States, 9 per cent by China, 1.6 per cent by Germany and 0.8 per cent by France. 
Neither has there been any marked increase in the importance of Latin America for 
Britain in relation to its other trading partners around the world. As a share of Britain’s 
overall goods export destinations, Latin America and the Caribbean constituted just 1.9 per 
cent of the total in 2016, down from a peak of 3.3 per cent in 2012. Likewise, as a source of 
British imports, Latin America and the Caribbean represented 1.6 per cent of the total in 
2016, down from 2.3 per cent in 2010.26 Britain is generally stronger in the export of services. 
But here too, Central and South America represent a small fraction of Britain’s total exports, 
lagging far behind other emerging markets like Asia.27 Latin America is a more significant 
destination for UK foreign direct investment, representing 10 per cent of the global total in 
                                                 
23 ‘Minister of State speech at the Latin America investment forum’; ‘Express Engineering takes full control of 
Brazilian Petrotec’, Subsea World News, 8 July 2013, https://subseaworldnews.com/2013/07/08/express-
engineering-takes-full-control-of-brazilian-petrotec/.   




25 Liam Fox, ‘Liam Fox – 2017 speech in Bogota’, 24 Aug. 2017, http://www.ukpol.co.uk/liam-fox-2017-speech-in-
bogota/.  
26 Trade statistics sourced from the World Bank’s World Integrated Trade Solution, 
https://wits.worldbank.org/Default.aspx?lang=en.  
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2015. However, this is similarly far behind other regions, such as the EU (40 per cent) and 
North America (32.5 per cent).28 
 The fact that Britain’s economic performance in Latin America has remained broadly 
unchanged since the initiation of the Canning Agenda suggests the presence of structural 
impediments to greater UK-Latin American trade and investment. A full analysis of such 
factors would go beyond the scope of this article’s focus on foreign policy. One factor worth 
noting in this regard, however, is the continuing frustration of British government officials 
at the performance of British companies in Latin America. This is a long-standing complaint. 
In 1929, following his trade mission to South America, Lord D’Abernon advised that 
Britain’s ‘methods of production, representation, advertising, marketing and sale require 
thorough revision’.29 Echoing this sentiment, Sir Hugo Swire, who served as Foreign Office 
Minister with responsibility for Latin America between 2012 and 2016, complains that while 
‘there are huge opportunities’ in Latin America, ‘British companies have not done as well in 
the region as they … should’.30 These frustrations on the part of officials reflect underlying 
factors impeding Britain’s economic relationship with Latin America over which they have 
limited control.  
One of the ways that governments can substantially alter the conditions for trade and 
investment in the contemporary era is through the negotiation of free trade agreements. The 
primary economic bloc in Latin America – Mercosur – has long been in negotiations with the 
European Union to try to secure such an agreement.31 One of the principal questions that 
emerged out of Britain’s decision to leave the European Union was whether the UK could 
strike free trade deals outside of the auspices of the EU following its departure. Theresa 
May’s initial commitment to extracting Britain from the EU Customs Union suggested 
Britain would be at liberty to make such deals once it officially leave the EU.32 There were 
also clear statements from Latin American officials in the aftermath of the referendum – 
including those of Mercosur states – of their desire to secure free trade deals with Britain 
post-Brexit. As the Brazilian Finance Minister Henrique Meirelles stated in September 2017, 
‘we are ready to open discussions with the British Government’.33 More recently, however, 
aspects of the government’s ‘Chequers proposal’ – such as the ‘common rule book’ and the 
‘facilitated customs arrangement’ – have cast doubt on Britain’s ability to secure free trade 
agreements in the post-Brexit era.34 
                                                 
28 ‘UK foreign direct investment: trends and analysis: summer 2017’ Office for National Statistics, 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/balanceofpayments/articles/ukforeigndirectinvestmenttrend
sandanalysis/summer2017#foreign-direct-investment-by-continent-and-industry.  
29 Quoted in Rory Miller, ‘The decline of Britain’s interest in Latin America’, History Today 41: 12, Dec. 1991, pp. 
42-8. For more details of Lord D’Abernon’s trade mission, see Roger Gravil, ‘Anglo-US trade rivalry in Argentina 
and the D’Abernon mission of 1929’, in David Rock ed., Argentina in the twentieth century (London: Duckworth, 
1975), pp. 41-65. 
30 Author interview with Sir Hugo Swire, 21 Feb. 2017. 
31 ‘The EU, Mercosur, and the two decade push for a free trade agreement’, World Politics Review, 12 Feb. 2018, 
https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/24173/the-eu-mercosur-and-the-two-decade-push-for-a-free-
trade-agreement.  
32 May, ‘The government's negotiating objectives for exiting the EU’. 
33 ‘Brazilian Finance Minister attempts to woo the UK with free trade offer’, Daily Telegraph, 30 Sept. 2017, 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/09/30/brazilian-finance-minister-attempts-woo-uk-free-trade-offer/.  
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Doubtless, the precise terms on which Britain exits the EU will impact its future 
trading relations with regions such as Latin America. Another question that remains is how 
high a priority any trade deal with Latin American countries will be as Britain repositions its 
global role in the post-Brexit world.  
  
Latin America as a strategic priority in British foreign policy 
 
Britain’s decline in Latin America throughout the twentieth century occurred, in part, 
because of broader global forces, such as the Great Depression and the two world wars. 
However, it was also the result of conscious decisions by successive British governments to 
focus their attentions and resources on other parts of the world. During the Great 
Depression of the 1930s Britain prioritised trade within the Empire at the expense of its 
economic interests in Latin America.40 In the post-war years Britain focused its energies on 
its ‘special relationship’ with the United States and – particularly from the 1970s onwards – 
European integration.41  
In the post-Cold War era Britain did seek to re-orientate its foreign policy to 
recognise a shift in the global balance of power towards countries of the global South – what 
William Hague referred to as a ‘networked world’.42 This included efforts in the 2000s to 
strengthen Britain’s relations with the two major emerging economies of Latin America – 
Mexico and Brazil.43 However, attention increasingly shifted to other parts of the world – 
most prominently the Middle East and North Africa, as part of the US-led ‘war on terror’. 
When Jeremy Browne became Foreign Office Minister with responsibility for Latin America 
in the coalition government in 2010, Latin America remained ‘bottom of the league table’ 
insofar as Britain’s global priorities were concerned.44  
The Canning Agenda aimed to reverse this trend by broadening the focus from the 
two largest countries in Latin America to engage the entirety of the region in a more 
systematic fashion. There is evidence of success in this regard insofar as Whitehall now 
appears to approach policy towards Latin America in a more coherent fashion. From the 
inter-departmental Prosperity Fund to the appointment in April 2018 of a new Trade 
Commissioner for Latin America, there is now what Jeremy Browne refers to as a ‘cross-
government effort’ to improve Britain’s standing in the region.45  
The Brexit vote has increased the focus on engaging with emerging powers from the 
extra-European world. Theresa May expressed this sentiment in her Lancaster House 
speech, arguing that Brexit offers the opportunity ‘to build a truly Global Britain … that 
reaches out to old friends and new allies alike’.47 In this respect, Britain’s leaving the 
                                                 
40 Bethell, ‘Britain and Latin America in Historical Perspective’, p. 17. 
41 Robert Self, British Foreign and Defence Policy since 1945 (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2010), chapters 4 and 
5.   
42 William Hague, ‘Britain’s foreign Policy in a networked world’, 1 July 2010, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/britain-s-foreign-policy-in-a-networked-world--2  
43 Kandiah and Mills eds, British Diplomacy in Latin America, pp. 20-23. 
44 Author interview with Jeremy Browne, 23 Oct. 2017. 
45 Browne interview; ‘New HM Trade Commissioners announced’, 3 April 2018, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-hm-trade-commissioners-announced. For an explanation of 
Whitehall’s previously disjointed approach to Latin America, see Bulmer-Thomas, ‘British Relations with Latin 
America into the 1990s’, pp. 215-16. 
47 May, ‘The government's negotiating objectives for exiting the EU’. 
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European Union could create the impetus to strengthen economic and political ties with 
Latin American countries. As Jeremy Browne puts it, as part of ‘a re-awakened global spirit 
and outlook’, Brexit potentially creates an impetus for Britain to think in ‘optimistic and 
positive terms about what new opportunities might arise in Latin America’.48 Latin 
American officials, also, perceive the potential for greater ties with Britain arising from 
Brexit. Eduardo dos Santos, the Brazilian ambassador to the UK, is unequivocal: ‘Brexit is an 
opportunity … to increase our trade relations, to increase our cooperation with Britain’.49 
Similarly, Colombia’s ambassador to the UK, Nestor Osorio, welcomes the sense conveyed 
in the aftermath of Brexit ‘that Britain is in the mood … to go global’.50   
Within the framework of Global Britain, however, Latin America competes for 
priority with other regions. And when moving from generalities to specifics, it is most 
commonly Asian countries – particularly China and India – that proponents of a Global 
Britain tend to highlight as the country’s future partners. Thus when the Foreign Secretary 
Boris Johnson advocated looking beyond Britain’s ‘immediate European hinterland’ to 
embrace ‘the rise of new powers’, it was to ‘China and East Asia’ that he referred in 
particular.51  Official policy statements seemingly confirm Latin America’s peripheral status. 
In a Foreign Office memorandum on the Global Britain strategy submitted to the House of 
Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Latin America is addressed only briefly under the 
sub-heading ‘Other regions’, following lengthy discussion of Britain’s relations with the 
United States, Europe and the Indo-Pacific.52   
The government’s aid policies further reflect Britain’s global priorities in the post-
Brexit era. Launched in April 2016, the Prosperity Fund aims not only to reduce poverty in 
developing countries, but also to ‘create opportunities for international business, including 
UK companies’. The fund is targeted at just 23 countries where the government has 
determined ‘development potential and the interest to the UK are the highest’. Of those 
countries, 11 are in Asia, 9 in the Middle East and North Africa, and 3 in Latin America 
(Brazil, Mexico and Colombia).53    
A persistent lack of interest in Latin America is also observable among the British 
business community. As British ambassador to Mexico from 2005 to 2009, Giles Paxman 
spent a lot of time trying to generate British interest in Mexican trade and investment 
opportunities. His experience was that it ‘was just very difficult to get British companies to 
focus on going that far away from home’.54 Following the launch of the Canning Agenda in 
2010, Jeremy Browne encountered a similar reluctance by British business to engage with 
Latin America. Whereas British businesspeople would fear being marked out as ‘gauchely 
parochial’ should they admit to not having travelled in Asia, ‘they probably would feel 
                                                 
48 Browne interview. 
49 Author interview with Eduardo dos Santos, 23 Jan. 2018. 
50 Author Interview with Nestor Osorio, 23 January 2018. 
51 Johnson, ‘Beyond Brexit’. 
52 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Global Britain, sixth report of session 2017-19, 12 March 2018. 
53 ‘Cross-government prosperity fund: background’, 21 Dec. 2017, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cross-government-prosperity-fund-programme/cross-
government-prosperity-fund-update; ‘The prosperity fund: annual report 2016/17’, Dec. 2017, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/.../FCO-Prosperity-Report-2016-2017.pdf. For the background of 
British aid to Latin America, see John Tanner, ‘Private solutions: debt and development’, in The Thatcher years, pp. 
18-25.  
54 Kandiah and Mills eds, British Diplomacy in Latin America, p. 25. 
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fairly comfortable about admitting that they had never been to Latin America’.55 Policy 
statements by the Confederation of British Industries and the Institute of Directors since the 
Brexit vote suggest the focus on European trade, and – to a lesser extent – engaging new 
markets in Asia, remains the priority.56    
Regardless of the priority accorded to Latin America in Britain’s post-Brexit 
worldview, a broader criticism of the Global Britain strategy concerns the resources 
available to government to facilitate its implementation. As Britain negotiates its withdrawal 
from the EU – and seeks to strengthen old relationships with European countries on a 
bilateral basis – doubts have been raised as to whether it is possible to simultaneously 
establish new relationships with emerging powers in the wider world. This is a recurring 
theme of the Foreign Affairs Committee report on Global Britain. As summarised in the 
report’s conclusion, ‘the Government must commit sufficient resources to achieve its 
ambitions around the world’.57   
In the immediate aftermath of the Brexit vote, the government’s ability – or 
willingness – to do this seemed to be in doubt. In a hearing of the House of Commons 
Foreign Affairs Committee in December 2017, evidence from Foreign Office officials 
revealed plans to reallocate resources from Asia, Africa and the Americas to create 50 extra 
staff for European embassies.58 This comes against a backdrop of cuts of approximately 40 
per cent in overall funding for British diplomacy. 59 Trends such as this are a cause of alarm 
for those concerned with the furtherance of the Canning Agenda in the post-Brexit era. 
Hugo Swire sees a danger in this context of ‘second and third tier countries [such as those in 
Latin America] slipping right down the agenda’ due to a lack of resources.61   
More recently, however, the Foreign Office has announced the creation of 250 new 
diplomatic posts, along with ten new sovereign missions, precisely to aid in fulfilling the 
Global Britain strategy in the post-Brexit era.62 Moreover, the Boris Johnson’s recent trip to 
Latin America, as well as the forthcoming visit of the Prime Minister to Argentina for the 
2018 G20 Summit, suggests the region is at least registering on the government’s radar.  
However, funding constraints and the diplomatic energies consumed by Brexit are 
likely to impact on Britain’s relations with Latin America for some time. These internal 
constraints upon Britain’s ability to strengthen its relations with Latin America are indicative 
of the broader limitations on the country’s role in the world in the contemporary era. As 
much as Britain’s global priorities in the post-Brexit era, its fortunes in Latin America will be 
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determined by the intentions and actions of other external powers with a presence in the 
region.         
    
Relations with other external powers in Latin America 
 
As Britain’s interests and influence in Latin America declined throughout the twentieth 
century, those of the United States rose. In one sense, the US was the inadvertent beneficiary 
of Britain’s retreat from Latin America. At times, however, the US consciously attempted to 
usurp Britain as the leading external power in the region. One such instance was during the 
Second World War, as US officials and businessmen sought to exploit opportunities created 
by the conflict to exclude British economic interests from Latin America.63 In seeking to 
adapt to US hegemony in the region, British officials during the 1940s contemplated a new 
role for Britain in Latin America as an ‘honest broker’. In this conception, Britain would act 
as an interlocutor between the US and its neighbours to the south: of worth to Latin 
American states as a counterweight to US dominance, and of use to the US in reconciling 
differences between Washington and Latin American governments.64  
This idea has persisted in various forms. Donald Lamont served as British 
ambassador to Venezuela at a time of intense animosity between the United States and the 
government of Hugo Chávez. ‘Because of the bad state of relations between the US and 
Venezuela’, states Lamont, ‘one likes to think [Chávez] would get something from us’ that 
he could not get from the Americans.65 In the contemporary context, Hugo Swire believes 
that Britain benefits in its relations with Latin American governments ‘from not being 
America … with all the baggage’ that US hegemony in the region entails.66 More 
colloquially, Jeremy Browne envisions Britain as the ‘emollient … good cop’ in Latin 
America, ‘to the Americans’ more strident … bad cop’.67     
Britain’s lack of an overbearing influence in Latin America has undoubtedly spared it 
much of the opprobrium directed towards the United States from the region throughout the 
twentieth century. In reality, however, Britain has – for the most part – mirrored US policy 
towards Latin America to such an extent as to make the role of an ‘honest broker’ in the 
region untenable. From Britain’s acquiescence in US efforts to remove Cheddi Jagan from 
power in British Guiana in the 1960s, to Margaret Thatcher’s support for the Reagan 
administration’s policies towards Central America in the 1980s, Britain has largely failed to 
differentiate its policies from those of the United States in Latin America.68        
This trend continues to the present day. One contemporary example of an issue of 
contention in Latin America where both Britain and the US have a direct interest is the 
diplomacy concerning the WikiLeaks founder, Julian Assange, since he took up residence in 
the Ecuadorian embassy in London in the summer of 2012. Ecuador granted Assange 
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political asylum when he was subject to an extradition request by Sweden on charges of 
rape. Assange feared that, should he travel to Sweden to face these charges, he would 
subsequently be extradited to the United States where he is under investigation for the 
release of diplomatic and military documents relating to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
The Swedish charges against Assange have since been dropped, and, following the election 
of President Moreno in April 2017, Ecuador has attempted various means to reach an 
agreement with Britain to secure Assange’s release from the embassy.69 Undoubtedly, British 
officials would like this issue resolved and for the source of conflict with Ecuador to be 
removed. As Hugo Swire puts it, ‘the whole Assange issue [is] a running sore’.70 At the time 
of writing, however, Britain has rebuffed all overtures by Ecuador towards this end, 
insisting that Assange would still be arrested should he leave the embassy for breaking the 
terms of his bail – whereupon he could potentially still face extradition to the US.71  
It is of course true that in this complex case involving many actors there are various 
reasons why Britain should refuse to cooperate with Ecuador’s attempts to resolve the 
situation. But the ‘special relationship’ with the United States is surely an important reason 
preventing Britain working with Ecuador to find a resolution to the impasse, given the 
strong US interest in seeing Assange brought to trial for his role in the leak of sensitive 
documents, as well as the pervasive influence of the ‘special relationship’ in British policy-
making.   
However, while the US presence in Latin America is undoubtedly predominant, its 
interest in the region has waned in recent decades. George W. Bush focused primarily on the 
Middle East as part of his ‘war on terror’, Barack Obama sought a ‘pivot to Asia’, and 
Donald Trump appears to be embarking upon a form of neo-isolationism, putting ‘America 
First’.72 The US neglect of Latin America may – in one sense – provide greater latitude for 
Britain, both to formulate an independent political approach to the region and enhance its 
economic standing as US interests retreat. However, Britain clearly does not have the 
resources – or indeed the desire – to fill any void left by the US in Latin America. Moreover, 
while the ‘special relationship’ with the US may have placed certain constraints on British 
policy-making in Latin America, there is no sense that the Canning Agenda has met with 
opposition in Washington. As William Hague states, the US government was ‘certainly 
conscious’ of the policy, ‘but in no way hostile to it’.73  
The one country that could potentially challenge US hegemony in Latin America is 
China. Chinese trade and investment in Latin America has increased exponentially in the 
post-Cold War era. While initially focusing primarily on purchases of raw materials to fuel 
its impressive economic growth, China’s economic interests in Latin America have recently 
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diversified, with a marked growth in direct investment.74 Following Xi Jingping’s 
ascendency to the Presidency in 2013, political relations between China and Latin American 
countries have also strengthened. 2015 saw the inaugural China-CELAC summit aimed at 
institutionalising political cooperation, and more recently, President Xi invited Latin 
American states to join the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, stating that ‘Latin America is 
the natural extension’ of the global infrastructure project.75 
China’s rise in Latin America may not bode well for the Canning Agenda. Whereas 
the United States generally promoted a liberal economic order in Latin America, inviting 
greater trade and investment from external powers, it is not clear that China would act along 
similar lines. As British ambassador to Brazil during the 2000s, Peter Collecott observed 
Chinese economic expansion in that country with some trepidation. As he recalls, China 
was, ‘in certain fields, quite aggressive commercially’.76 More generally, while in the United 
States, Britain was dealing with a regional hegemon in Latin America with which it had a 
long-standing close relationship based on shared values, the same cannot be said of China.  
The role of great powers like the United States and China in Latin America shapes 
the broad environment in which Britain operates. In terms of competitors in the region with 
a similar scale of economic and political interests, it is other European countries – such as 
Germany, France, Spain and the Netherlands – that are most relevant. When William Hague 
announced the Canning Agenda in 2010, Britain was of course part of the European Union 
alongside these nations, with no apparent prospect of leaving. Indeed, in the years that 
followed, Britain often pursued its quest for greater trade with Latin America through EU 
mechanisms, such as EU-CELAC summits. In the post-Brexit era, Britain will pursue its 
goals in Latin America not in partnership with EU member-states, but as a rival.  
As noted above, the extent to which Britain can diverge from the EU in negotiating 
future free trade agreements in Latin America will depend to on the terms of any Brexit 
agreement. What is clear is that, from the perspective of Latin American countries, 
negotiating solely with Britain would have advantages over attempting to secure deals with 
the EU. The principal obstacle to a Mercosur-EU trade deal has been the protections for 
agriculture demanded by certain EU states – particularly France.77 This form of 
protectionism is much less pronounced in Britain. As the Brazilian ambassador in London 
puts it, whereas ‘the European market is very closed’ to agricultural exports from Brazil, 
‘Britain is a free trade country’.78 At the same time, the desire to increase agricultural exports 
would be one of the major prizes of any trade deal for Latin American states.79  
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 The attitude of Latin American states on key issues like this remind us of the central 
role played by the region’s governments in Britain’s pursuance of the Canning Agenda. 
Whereas in the nineteenth century era of British hegemony, these former colonial states 
struggled to exert agency to influence events, the twenty-first century has seen Latin 
American countries emerge as important regional – and in some cases international – 
powers.  
 
Political relations with Latin American countries 
 
One of the criticisms of the Canning Agenda has been that it merely harks back to a lost era 
of British imperialism.81 Clearly conscious of the potential for such a charge, Hague sought 
to make clear in his address announcing the policy that Britain sought to re-launch its 
relations with the region, not on the basis of imperialistic exploitation, but on a ‘modern 
footing’ of ‘equal partnerships with countries in Latin America’.82 Has the Canning Agenda 
lived up to this promise? 
Certainly, it would be wrong to characterise the Canning Agenda as wholly a British 
construct without input from Latin American governments. When formulating the policy as 
Shadow Foreign Secretary, Hague met with Latin American ambassadors in London and 
received a clear message that the countries wanted ‘more of Britain’ in the region.83 The 
Mexican ambassador to Britain, reflecting on the Canning Agenda in practice, is clear that ‘it 
has not only been a UK-driven approach’, but rather ‘a bilaterally agreed upon strategy’.84  
 Cooperation between Britain and Latin American states has been in evidence across a 
number of political and strategic fronts. For example, in recent years Britain has provided 
aid, as well as military and diplomatic support, to the Colombian government’s efforts to 
end its long-running conflict with the FARC rebels.85 Greater strategic cooperation has also 
been established between Britain and Brazil. In September 2010, the two countries signed a 
Defence Cooperation Treaty laying the basis for technology transfers, joint military 
exercises, and intelligence sharing.86 One example of the kind of collaboration envisaged in 
the treaty came in 2014 when the Commander of the Brazilian Navy visited the UK to 
discuss collaborative training activities and tour British naval facilities.87 The defence treaty 
was supplemented in 2012 by the inauguration of the UK-Brazil Strategic Dialogue. In this 
forum, the Foreign Ministers of the two countries have met on an annual basis to discuss 
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cooperation on global issues of joint concern, ranging from nuclear non-proliferation to 
Middle East peace.88  
It is clear, then, that political relations between Britain and Latin American states 
have broadened in scope and proceeded on the basis of mutual respect in recent years. This 
reflects an acknowledgement on Britain’s part that Latin American countries are 
increasingly playing a greater role in international politics, reflected in the UK’s support for 
Brazil gaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.89 However, British political and 
strategic objectives in Latin American are constantly at risk of being jeopardised by the 
ongoing dispute with Argentina over the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands.90 Long a 
source of friction in relations between the UK and Argentina, the dispute also has potential 
implications for Britain’s broader efforts to enhance its political relationships in Latin 
America.  
Under the Kirchner governments (2003-15), Argentina adopted the strategy on the 
Falklands issue – with a large measure of success – of ensuring that Latin American 
governments adopt a united front in favour of its position in international and regional 
forums.91 More substantively, Argentina sought to hinder British relations with other Latin 
American states by winning commitments from its neighbours to limit political and strategic 
cooperation with the UK. Again, these efforts met with some success, for example in the 
bans upheld by Brazil and Uruguay on Royal Navy ships docking in their ports.92 In this 
way, the Falklands dispute represented a hindrance for Britain in its aim of establishing 
closer relationships with Latin American governments. Hugo Swire expresses this 
frustration, describing how throughout his experience of seeking to improve Britain’s ties 
with Latin America, the Argentine government ‘would do their level best, whenever we 
were making headway elsewhere in the region’, to remind other governments of the 
importance of ‘Latin American solidarity’ over the Falklands issue.93 Similarly, Peter 
Collecott recalls that when meeting with UK ambassadors serving throughout the Southern 
Cone countries of Latin America, the general view ‘was that the Falkland conflict was the 
elephant in the room every time they talked to their corresponding Government’.  
Collecott’s own experience in Brazil, however, was that the Falklands issue was not a 
major impediment to strengthening bilateral relations. As he explains it, ‘the Brazilians were 
very adept at having a rather nice dual policy’. This consisted of publically supporting 
Argentina over its claims to the Falkland Islands, while at the same time pursuing ‘a private 
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policy which was much more accommodating to the British on practical things’.94 Latin 
American officials support this view. For example, Eduardo dos Santos acknowledges that 
while Britain’s conflict with Argentina is ‘not very helpful’, ‘as far as Brazil is concerned, we 
don’t see that as an impediment’ to closer relations with Britain.95 Julián Ventura remarks in 
similar terms, that while Mexico supports the ‘regional consensus’ on the Falkland Islands, 
‘it is not an issue that is part of a bilateral agenda’ between the UK and Mexico.96  
Moreover, since the 2015 election of President Macri in Argentina, much of the 
poison of the Falklands issue has been taken out of UK-Argentine relations. While there has 
been no formal change in Argentina’s stance on the Falklands (indeed, its claim to 
sovereignty is written into the country’s constitution), it is clear that the new president does 
not wish to define relations with Britain solely in the context of the dispute in the way that 
his predecessors did. Indeed, when the Foreign Office Minister Alan Duncan visited Buenos 
Aires in September 2016, the UK and Argentina agreed to cooperate on a host of issues in 
global politics, and to collaborate in exploration for hydrocarbons in the South Atlantic.97  
Boris Johnson further reinforced the rapprochement in UK-Argentine relations when he laid 
a wreath to commemorate those who died in the Falklands war on his recent trip to Buenos 
Aires.98  
Macri’s election in Argentina was emblematic of a broader political shift in Latin 
America away from the so-called ‘pink tide’ leftist regimes that won office throughout the 
region in the first decade of the twenty-first century, towards more centre-right, pro-market 
leaders.99 British officials have generally welcomed this development insofar as it leads to a 
greater sense of shared values between the UK and Latin American countries, more likely to 
facilitate political cooperation. As Jeremy Browne comments on the ideological reorientation 
of Latin America, many countries have ‘progressed in a direction which makes them more 
compatible with Britain in terms of the way we work together’.100 
 Notwithstanding this apparent alignment of values between the UK and Latin 
America, there remains a lingering frustration on the part of British officials at the way in 
which Latin American countries approach international politics. On key international issues 
of recent years, leading Latin American countries have often been at odds with Britain. In 
the build-up to war in Iraq in 2003, neither of the two Latin American countries then on the 
UN Security Council (Chile and Mexico) were willing to side with Britain and the United 
States in backing military action.101 Similarly, when the UK (along with France and Lebanon) 
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proposed the UN Security Council resolution that led to intervention in Libya in 2011, Brazil 
was among the countries to abstain from the vote.102  
The reluctance of Latin American countries to join Britain in these types of 
interventions leads Peter Collecott to observe that while Latin American countries ‘ought to 
be part … of the Western world’ they ‘have been very loath to see themselves like that’.103 
William Hague expands on this point, noting that while the countries of Latin America share 
democratic values with countries like Britain, they ‘come from a different historical 
standpoint’ as former colonies. As a result, ‘they often have a very different understanding 
of what a global role is.’104  
This different approach reflects the fact that emerging powers in Latin America (and 
elsewhere in the world) do not wish to simply mimic the kind of global role played 
traditionally by Britain and other Western countries. Rather, they intend to fashion a world-
role for themselves reflective of their own interests and values – and indeed to reshape the 
international order according to their differing perspectives. As Harold Trinkunas has 
written in reference to Brazil, the principal emerging power in Latin America, ‘Brazil would 
like to be a rule shaper rather than a rule taker’ when engaging in global governance.105 
More broadly, Latin American countries’ enthusiasm for China’s Belt and Road Initiative 
can, on one level, be seen to endorse the Chinese description of the policy as a means of 
promoting ‘economic globalization that is open, inclusive, balanced and beneficial to all’, 
with all the implied criticism of the current global economic system that such a statement 
implies.106 It is clear, then, that while aligned with Britain in some respects, the emerging 
powers of Latin America are likely to take a divergent view on major issues of global 




In assessing the Canning Agenda, William Hague is surely correct to caution that ‘any 
initiative of this kind is only really successful if pursued over decades’, and, as such, it is ‘too 
early to say … how successful it has been’ at this stage.107 Nevertheless, some preliminary 
conclusions can be drawn. It is clear that a policy of strengthening Britain’s relationships 
with Latin American states has been pursued across government with a reasonably clear 
focus and undoubted enthusiasm in many quarters since 2010. This article has, however, 
identified substantial impediments to the success of the Canning Agenda across the range of 
areas discussed. The good news for those pursuing the Canning Agenda is that none of 
these challenges is insurmountable. The more sobering assessment is that overcoming them 
will require some fundamental changes in Britain’s world role.  
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Improving Britain’s economic performance in Latin America will require – at the 
least – a substantial reorientation on the part of British business to embrace commerce with 
the region, along with a more general improvement in Britain’s export trade capabilities. 
Ensuring Latin America is granted sufficient attention in British foreign policy-making will 
require not only that the necessary resources are allocated to deliver on the rhetoric of 
Global Britain, but also that Britain’s approach is truly global, rather than limited to the 
principal emerging powers in Asia. Achieving Britain’s objectives in Latin America will also 
be dependent on managing relations with other external powers in the region in a pragmatic 
fashion, while also retaining a clear-eyed focus on Britain’s independent goals. Finally, 
managing political relationships with Latin American states will require both sensitivity in 
dealing with issues of contention like that of the Falklands dispute, and also a willingness to 
acknowledge and embrace the changing conceptions of a global role pursued by countries 
like Brazil.  
Britain’s impending departure from the European Union necessitates bold thinking 
about the role the country plays in the world. While creating many challenges for Britain, 
Brexit also creates opportunities, including the possibility of strengthening relations with 
parts of the world of increasing economic and political significance, like Latin America. If 
the Canning Agenda is to be a success, this moment of change must be harnessed towards 
achieving the goals set out by William Hague in 2010.           
